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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

THE STATE OF UTAH

:

PlaintiffAppellee
v.

:

ISAAC J. HOLLANDS

:

Case No. 990375-CA
Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant

JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a judgment of conviction, following a guilty plea, for one
count of attempt to receive or transfer a stolen vehicle, a third degree felony, in violation
of Utah Code Annotated sections 41-la-1316(2) (1998) and 76-4-101 (1995). This court
has jurisdiction under Utah Code Annotated section 78-2a-3(2)(e) (1996) which grants
the Utah Court of Appeals jurisdiction over appeals from the district court for criminal
convictions other than for a first degree or capital felony.

RELEVANT STATUTORY PROVISION
Utah Code Annotated section 76-3-401(4) (Supp. 1999) provides:
A court shall consider the gravity and circumstances of the
offenses and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of
the defendant in determining whether to impose consecutive
sentences.

STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE, STANDARD OF REVIEW AND
PRESERVATION OF THE ARGUMENTS
Whether the trial judge abused her discretion in ordering Appellant's sentence to
run consecutive to a sentence from a prior conviction without considering the ordinary
nature of the offenses, Appellant's history of mainly minor, non-violent crimes, his
repeated acceptance of responsibility, and his proven commitment to be rehabilitated.
The standard for reviewing the sentencing decisions of the trial court is an abuse of
discretion. State v. Montova. 929 P.2d 356, 358 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). This issue is
preserved at R. 52: 4-11.l See Addendum A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The state filed an Information on August 16, 1997, charging Appellant Isaac J.
Hollands with one count each of receiving a stolen motor vehicle, failure to stop at the
scene of an accident, and giving a false identity to a peace officer. R. 1-3. The district
attorney and Mr. Hollands subsequently entered into a plea agreement in which Mr.
Hollands agreed to plead guilty to one count of attempt to receive a stolen vehicle. R.
25. In turn, the district attorney agreed to recommend to the sentencing judge that any
prison sentence run concurrent to a sentence Mr. Hollands was already serving. R. 27B.2

*The transcript of the sentencing hearing is contained in one volume marked nR. 52."
The internal page numbers of that volume are listed after "R. 52."
2

The record contains two pages marked "27." For purposes of this brief, the second
page marked 27 (page 4 of the plea agreement) will be referred to as fl27B."
2

On February 9, 1999, Mr. Hollands pleaded guilty to one count of attempt to
receive stolen property. R. 25-27B. The trial judge sentenced Mr. Hollands on April 1,
1999, to a term of zero to five years in the state prison and ordered it to run consecutive
to Mr. Hollands' prior sentence. R. 37; 52: 10-11; Addendum B. Mr. Hollands filed a
timely notice of appeal on April 27, 1999. R. 38.

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On July 25, 1997, Mr. Hollands and a male companion sumamed "McCarty" were
driving in West Valley City when another vehicle collided into them.3 R. 53: 2A.4 Mr.
Hollands and Mr. McCarty fled on foot from the scene of the accident. Id When the
police arrived, they found several citizens who were detaining Mr. Hollands and Mr.
McCarty a few blocks away. Id. After investigating, the police learned that the car in
which Mr. Hollands was traveling had been stolen from a car dealership two and-and-ahalf weeks previously. Id. The police also found on Mr. McCarty drug paraphernalia
and methamphetamine. Id.

3

The district attorney conceded in the trial court that Mr. Hollands was not at fault for
the traffic accident and, therefore, restitution was not warranted. R. 48.
4

The volume marked R. 53 contains a presentence report that was prepared for Mr.
Hollands' prior conviction in Weber County and the addendum to that report that was
prepared for the present matter. The pages to the addendum will be followed by an "A"
while the pages to the presentence report will be followed by a f,B." The addendum does
not include Mr. McCarty's first name.
3

Mr. Hollands was released on bail on August 19, 1997. R. 10-11. On October 21,
1997, a Wyoming Highway Patrol officer stopped Mr. Hollands for a traffic violation on
Interstate 80 in Wyoming. R. 53: 2B. A vehicle records search revealed that the car was
registered to Denise Warner and "Justin McCarti" of Midvale, Utah. Id. at 3B. During a
pat down of Mr. Hollands and an inventory search of the car, the patrol officer found
almost $4,000 in cash, a small container of amphetamine and numerous receipts for
recently purchased items commonly used to produce methamphetamine. Id. at 2B-3B.
The patrol officer found another receipt dated October 18, 1997, for the rental of a
storage unit in Weber County, Utah. Id, A records check on Justin McCarti revealed
that he had been arrested several times on drug-related charges and he was a suspect in
numerous other drug offenses. Id, at 3B.
After receiving this information, Ogden City police officers searched the storage
unit and discovered a clandestine methamphetamine lab along with two weapons. Id. at
4B. Although Mr. Hollands denied manufacturing methamphetamine, he admitted to
police that he used a fictitious name to rent the unit for the operators of the drug lab. Id.
at 4B-5B. His role in the lab was to procure the materials used to manufacture the drug.
Id. Mr. Hollands conceded further that he became involved in the drug lab to obtain
drugs for himself and to sell them to support his drug habit. Id. at 5B-6B.
As part of a plea bargain, Mr. Hollands pleaded guilty in the Second Judicial
District Court to one count each of attempted operation of a clandestine drug lab and
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possession of a dangerous weapon by a restricted person. R. 53: 5 A. On April 23, 1998,
District Court Judge Michael D. Lyons sentenced Mr. Hollands to prison terms of one to
15 years for the drug conviction and zero to five years for the weapon offense. Id. Judge
Lyons ordered both terms to run concurrently.
Following the disposition of the proceedings in Weber County, Mr. Hollands
agreed to plead guilty in the present matter to one count of attempt to receive a stolen
vehicle. R. 25. In return, the district attorney promised to recommend that any prison
sentence run concurrently with Mr. Hollands' sentences previously imposed for the drug
and weapon convictions. R. 27B. Mr. Hollands entered his guilty plea on February 9,
1999. R. 25-27B.
Mr. Hollands reported during the presentence investigation that he began using
marijuana when he was 13 years old and continued to use it weekly until his arrest in
Wyoming in 1997. R. 53: 18B. When he was 18, he started to use methamphetamine on
a daily basis which also continued until he was incarcerated in Wyoming. Id, Despite
his history of drug abuse, Mr. Hollands had never received substance abuse counseling.
R. 53: 6A.
Mr. Hollands admitted his drug dependency and resolved to stop using drugs and
avoid people who use them. R. 53: 18B, 22B. To help him to reach these goals, Mr.
Hollands committed to participate in drug and alcohol counseling and to graduate from
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high school or obtain his GED certificate.5 Id, at 15B, 17B-18B. Mr. Hollands' mother
pledged to help her son to keep his commitments and offered to let him live with her
upon condition that he receive drug counseling and obtain his GED or high school
diploma. Id. at 15B, 20B.
Mr. Hollands admitted that he knew the car he was using was stolen. R. 53: 3 A.
In a written statement included in the addendum to the presentence report, he accepted
responsibility for his criminal behavior and resolved to improve himself:
"I made a bad choice to be driving the car. I can't change the
past I can only better my future and not make the wrong
choices.... I knew it was wrong what I did. I am ready to
accept full responsibility of my actions. Over the past 18
months of my encarsiration [sic] I have realized that this is
not the life I want to leed [sic]. I have a lot more going for
me out there then [sic] in here [prison]."
R.53:3A.
According to the presentence report, Mr. Hollands had been arrested 13 times as a
juvenile for several minor offenses including possession of tobacco, curfew violations,
minor theft and traffic violations. R. 53: 7B-9B. The only juvenile conviction involving
any violence was for an assault with substantial risk of bodily injury for which Mr.
Hollands received a nonjudicial fine. Id, at 8B. The juvenile courts had never detained
Mr. Hollands for any of his offenses or even placed him on formal probation. Id. at 13B,
22B.

5

Mr. Hollands attended high school only through the 11th grade. R. 53: 15B.
6

Mr. Hollands was also arrested several times as an adult, mainly for drug-related
crimes, theft and traffic offenses. Id. at 9B-12B. Other than his Weber County
convictions, his only adult convictions were two misdemeanor offenses for carrying a
concealed weapon and possessing drug paraphernalia for which he received probation.
Id. at 9B, 13B. All of Mr. Hollands' criminal activities occurred while he was under the
influence of controlled substances. Id, at 18B. Although the addendum to the
presentence report does not recommend a particular sentence, the Department of Adult
Parole and Probation did not disagree with the district attorney's recommendation of
concurrent sentencing. R. 53: 6A-7A.
Judge Denise Lindberg sentenced Mr. Hollands on April 1, 1999. R. 52.
Defense counsel requested Judge Lindberg to follow the district attorney's
recommendation and to impose any sentence concurrently with Mr. Hollands' one to 15
year sentence from Weber County. R. 52: 5. As defense counsel noted, even though Mr.
Hollands' Weber County convictions were his first felonies, he was denied probation and
was given a lengthy prison term. Id. at 5-6. Defense counsel argued that consecutive
punishments was not warranted because Mr. Hollands' present offense and the Weber
County crimes occurred within a three-month period during which he associated with
drug manufacturers. Id. at 7-8. In addition, Mr. Hollands' incarceration prevented him
from making support payments to a three-year old child that he fathered. Id, at 6-7.
Thus, Mr. Hollands' rehabilitative needs could be best addressed by a reasonable term of

7

imprisonment, drug counseling in prison followed by release rather than a lengthy prison
term. Id.
Mr. Hollands informed the court that he was attending substance abuse classes in
prison and that he was working toward receiving his GED certificate. Id. at 9. He also
reiterated his determination "to lead my life in the right direction when I get out, be
responsible and start to be a [productive] member of society." Id.
The sentencing judge declined to impose concurrent sentences and, instead,
sentenced Mr. Hollands to a term of zero to five years and ordered the sentence to run
consecutive to the Weber County sentences. R. 52: 10-11. In making this determination,
the sentencing judge concluded that Mr. Hollands did not "deserve a break" for starting
his criminal career "at the top" with a serious drug crime. R. 52: 10. She also
emphasized Mr. Hollands' numerous criminal arrests and convictions along with the fact
that Mr. Hollands was given the benefit of pleading down from a second degree to a third
degree felony. Based on the matrix computed by the Department of Adult Parole and
Probation, Mr. Hollands must serve a minimum of 30 months imprisonment for his
present offense. R. 53: Appendix to Addendum to Presentence Report).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
In sentencing Mr. Hollands to consecutive terms, the sentencing judge failed to
consider the ordinary nature of Mr. Hollands' offenses, his arrests for mainly minor, non-
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violent crimes, and the absence of injury to any victims. See U.C.A. § 76-3-401(4)
(Supp. 1999); State v. Galli. 967 P.2d 930, 938 (Utah 1998). She also neglected to
acknowledge that Mr. Hollands confessed to his crimes, repeatedly took responsibility
for his actions, committed to improve himself and demonstrated that commitment by
receiving substance abuse counseling and working toward receiving his GED certificate.
Instead of applying these statutory factors, the sentencing judge overstated the severity of
Mr. Hollands' drug offense and criminal history. The imposition of consecutive
sentences bars the Board of Pardons and Parole from releasing Mr. Hollands for at least
two and-a-half additional years even if the steps Mr. Hollands has already taken toward
rehabilitation prove genuine. The sentencing judge's failure to apply the relevant
statutory factors in sentencing Mr. Hollands was an abuse of discretion.

ARGUMENT
THE SENTENCING JUDGE ABUSED HER DISCRETION
IN IMPOSING CONSECUTIVE SENTENCES GIVEN THE
UNREMARKABLE NATURE OF THE OFFENSES. MR.
HOLLANDS' HISTORY OF MAINLY MINOR. NONVIOLENT CRIMES. HIS ACCEPTANCE OF
RESPONSIBILITY. AND HIS DEMONSTRATED
COMMITMENT TOWARD REHABILITATION
In sentencing Mr. Hollands to consecutive sentences, the sentencing judge failed
to consider the circumstances of the offenses, the minor nature of Mr. Hollands's
criminal history, his commitment to change, or his rehabilitative needs. Rather, she
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focused on the number of Mr. Hollands' prior arrests and convictions and paid particular
attention to the seriousness of his prior drug conviction. Even considering those factors,
Mr. Hollands crime of attempting to receive a stolen vehicle did not warrant consecutive
sentencing.
This court reviews trial judges' sentencing decisions for abuse of discretion. State
v. Montova. 929 P.2d 356, 358 (Utah Ct. App. 1996). "An abuse of discretion results
when the judge 'fails to consider all legally relevant factors . . . . ' " State v. McCovey,
803 P.2d 1234, 1235 (Utah 1990) (quoting State v. Gibbons, 779 P.2d 1133, 1135 (Utah
1989)). In determining whether to impose consecutive rather concurrent sentences,
courts must consider "the gravity and circumstances of the offenses and the history,
character, and rehabilitative needs of the defendant...." U.C.A. § 76-3-401(4) (Supp.
1999). Courts must remember further that, under Utah law, concurrent sentences are
favored over consecutive ones. State v. Galli. 967 P.2d 930, 938 (Utah 1998).
The "gravity and circumstances of the offenses" do not warrant consecutive
sentences. U.C.A. § 76-3-401(4) (Supp. 1999). Although, admittedly, the drug
conviction in Weber County was a serious offense, Mr. Hollands received a stiff 15-year
sentence and was denied probation even though this crime was his first felony
conviction. In addition, the circumstances of that offense were unremarkable: Mr.
Hollands served as the procurer of materials for a clandestine lab as a means of
supporting his drug habit. In apparent agreement that this offense was an ordinary drug
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lab conviction, the district attorney agreed to let Mr. Hollands plead down from a first
degree felony to a second degree felony attempt offense. Moreover, the district attorney
conceded that Mr. Hollands' involvement in the drug lab did not warrant consecutive
sentences for the drug and weapon convictions.
This case similarly involved an ordinary crime of possessing a stolen vehicle.
Like the drug offense, the district attorney conceded that this offense was
undistinguished and allowed Mr. Hollands to plead down to a third degree felony attempt
conviction. And, after considering the facts and circumstances of the drug offense and
the present crime, the district attorney recommended concurrent sentences.
The sentencing judge failed to appreciate these mitigating circumstances and
ruled, instead, that Mr. Hollands' did not "deserve a break" for committing a serious drug
offense as his first felony conviction. R. 52: 10. In ruling that imposing concurrent
sentences would be a "break" for Mr. Hollands, the judge erroneously appeared to place
the burden of justifying concurrent sentences on him. Under Utah law, the imposition of
concurrent sentences is presumed over consecutive ones. State v. Galli, 967 P.2d 930,
938 (Utah 1998). In this case, the ordinary circumstances of the offenses do not defeat
the presumption of concurrent sentencing.
Second, the sentencing judge failed to consider the minor nature of Mr. Hollands'
prior criminal history. U.C.A. § 76-3-401(4) (Supp. 1999). Although Mr. Hollands had
been arrested numerous times as a juvenile, those arrests were for such minor matters as
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curfew violations, possession of tobacco, minor theft and traffic violations. See State v.
Galli. 967 P.2d 930, 938 (Utah 1998) (minor traffic offenses, a prior misdemeanor theft
conviction and uncharged bail jumping did not support consecutive sentencing). Other
than a juvenile arrest for an assault with substantial risk of bodily injury, Mr. Hollands
has no history of violence. R.53: 8. The juvenile courts apparently agreed that Mr.
Hollands' juvenile offenses were not serious because they declined to detain him or even
place him on probation.
Mr. Hollands' only other adult convictions were for misdemeanor possession of a
weapon and drug paraphernalia. There is no evidence in his history of injury to any
victims. See Galli. 967 P.2d at 938 (concurrent sentences warranted, in part, because
defendant did not injure victims or employ violence); State v. Strunk, 846 P.2d 1297,
1302 (Utah 1993) (absence of violence in defendant's prior criminal history supported
concurrent sentences for aggravated sexual assault and kidnaping). Nevertheless, the
sentencing judge failed to even consider the minor nature of and circumstances
surrounding the bulk of Mr. Hollands' prior offenses and, instead, she simply tallied the
number of prior arrests and convictions.
Third, the sentencing judge further failed to acknowledge Mr. Hollands'
"character" and, in particular, the significant steps he has taken to confront his drug
problem. U.C.A. § 76-3-401(4) (Supp. 1999). Mr. Hollands confessed to his felony
offenses in both Weber and Salt Lake Counties and he has repeatedly "accepted] full
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responsibility [for his] actions." R. 53: 3A. He has also recognized the necessity of
staying away from those people who influenced him to participate in criminal activity.
R. 53: 22B. Not only has Mr. Hollands expressed his desire to improve himself, he has
demonstrated his commitment to change by participating in substance abuse counseling
and working toward receiving his GED certificate so that, in his words, he can "lead my
life in the right direction when I get out, be responsible and start to be a [productive]
member of society." R. 52: 9.
Rather than crediting Mr. Hollands for accepting responsibility for his criminal
conduct and taking steps to improve himself, the sentencing judge ruled that concurrent
sentences were not warranted because Mr. Hollands had already been granted leniency
by being allowed to plead down to a third degree felony. R. 52: 10. In determining
whether to impose concurrent versus consecutive sentences, Utah Code Annotated
section 76-3-401(4) (Supp. 1999) requires judges to consider only the "gravity and
circumstances of the offenses and the history, character, and rehabilitative needs of the
defendant...." If anything, plea agreements support imposing concurrent sentencing:
the Utah Supreme Court has ruled that concurrent sentences are appropriate when, as
here, the defendant pleads guilty and has "voluntarily confessedf,] admitted responsibility
for the crimes he committed . . . [and] expressed a commitment and hope to improve
himself." State v. Gallu 967 P.2d 930, 938 (Utah 1998). Under the sentencing judge's
view, criminal defendants are actually discouraged from pleading guilty and accepting
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responsibility for their criminal conduct.
Finally, and most importantly, the sentencing judge completely ignored Mr.
Hollands' substantial "rehabilitative needs." U.C.A. § 76-3-401(4) (Supp. 1999). The
root of Mr. Hollands' prior criminal behavior is his drug habit. In particular, Mr.
Hollands' felony convictions involved a period of three months during which he
associated with people who manufactured drugs.6 Nevertheless, the sentencing judge
never considered addressing Mr. Hollands' drug addiction but instead was determined to
punish Mr. Hollands for his numerous arrests and convictions.
Had the sentencing judge evaluated Mr. Hollands' rehabilitative needs, she would
have realized that 30 months of additional prison time was not warranted. At the time of
sentencing, Mr. Hollands had repeatedly stated his commitment to quit drugs and to
become a productive member of society. He demonstrated his commitment to change by
enrolling in substance abuse counseling and working toward his GED certificate. In
addition, his mother supports him in his goals and he has a three-year old child who he
plans to support when he is released. Nevertheless, even if Mr. Hollands resolves his
drug habit while in prison and he develops the skills necessary to be a productive citizen,
the imposition of consecutive sentences prevents the Board of Pardons and Parole ("the
Board") from releasing him for two and-a-half years after he completes his one-to-15-

6

Both of Mr. Hollands' felony convictions involved a person or persons named
McCarty or McCarti.
14

year sentence from Weber County.
Given Mr. Hollands' acceptance of responsibility and the steps he has already
taken to improve himself, his rehabilitative needs can best be met by allowing the Board
"the flexibility to adjust [his] prison stay to match his progress in rehabilitation and
preparation to return to society." State v. StrunL 846 P.2d 1297, 1302 (Utah 1993). As
the Utah Supreme Court has observed, "The Board is in a far better position than a court
to monitor a defendant's subsequent behavior and possible progress toward rehabilitation
while in prison and to adjust the maximum sentence accordingly." State v. Smith, 909
P.2d 236, 244 (Utah 1995).
The Utah Supreme Court's decision in State v. Galli. 967 P.2d 930 (1998), is in
agreement. After pleading guilty in three separate cases to aggravated robbery before
three different judges, Galli was sentenced to consecutive sentences. Id. at 932-33. The
Utah Supreme Court ruled that, in ordering the sentences to run consecutively, the trial
judges failed to consider Galli's lack of serious prior offenses, the absence of harm to
any victims and the limited use of force used in the robberies. Id. Galli had also
confessed to the crimes, accepted responsibility for his conduct and expressed a
commitment to improve himself. And, although Galli had absconded and was out of the
state for three years, his was law-abiding throughout that period and had demonstrated
his potential for rehabilitation. Id. The Court concluded that "[t]he imposition of
concurrent rather than consecutive sentences better serves Galli's rehabilitative needs by
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allowing the Board of Pardons and Parole to release him from prison after five years if he
has shown genuine progress toward rehabilitation." Id.
Mr. Hollands, similarly, has a history of minor offenses and he has no record of
any significant violence or injury to any victims. Like Galli, he has accepted
responsibility for his crimes and has demonstrated his commitment to rehabilitation by
admitting his drug problem, receiving drug counseling and working toward his GED
certificate. Moreover, the circumstances surrounding Mr. Hollands' Weber County
convictions for a second degree felony drug charge and a third degree felony weapon
offense together with his present conviction for a third degree felony appear to be no
more serious than Mr. Galli's three first degree felony convictions for aggravated
robbery. Affording Mr. Hollands the possibility of earlier release and parole supervision
is especially appropriate because he has never had the opportunity of probation for a
felony conviction. Instead, the imposition of consecutive sentences denies the Board of
flexibility to release Mr. Hollands for 30 months even should he demonstrate "genuine
progress toward rehabilitation." Galli, 967 P.2d at 938.
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CONCLUSION
Appellant Isaac J. Hollands requests that this Court remand this matter to the trial
court and to order the trial judge to resentence him to a concurrent term of zero to five
years.
SUBMITTED, this j£fc day of August, 1999.

^-fyp

KENT R. HART
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
DAVID P.S. MACK
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A

Page 4

1j

them it looks like 3/26/76 is the correct day.
It's correct in one place, incorrect in
THE COURT:

Okay.

I notice on the

front of the presentence is incorrect.
I'll

—

Okay,

—
MS. DENHARDT:

I have one additional

concern and that is the matrix.

It's scoring him

on the matrix and I think sometimes the presentence
people misunderstand what the entry is where they
list —

they give four points for supervision

history, current supervision of pretrial release.
I think sometimes they score them at four if
they're currently under supervision, but I don't
think that that was intended because I don't think
there's anything wrong with being under pretrial
supervision.

It's whether they have previously

absconded from or (Inaudible) pretrial use of
supervision.

And from what I can tell in here,

that didn't happen.
I think that he should score zero on
that and not a four, which would substantially
change his ranking and put him in the good rather
than the moderate category on the matrix.

So

that's a pretty significant one and I've seen this
happen before.

But in looking at three being a

Page 5

1!

prior revocation, I don't see how simply being on

2|

pretrial release would be a worse thing than that.

j

3

So that would be our position on that.

We would

maintain that that should be a zero because he's
never had probation of any kind.
on probation (Inaudible).

He's never been

That's the only other

correction.
THE COURT:

Okay.

Any other

information that you believe needs to be raised?
MS. DENHARDT:

Yes, that we were asking

you to impose a sentence confirming the 1/15
sentence given to him by Judge Lyon.

Now, there

are two reasons for that, the first one being the
fact that Judge Lyon committed Mr. Hollands to
prison when he had no prior probation history and
that's kind of a rare thing that that would happen.
Now, he did that because of the nature of the
offense and the concern that we have in this
community currently with the clandestined lab
problem.

And so I can't say that his doing that

was unjustified, I mean I see why he would do that.
But my point is, is that he was treated harshly
because of the nature of the offense already by not
being given any opportunity at probation.
This is a young man who has virtually
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no jail experience before this and now he's finding
2

himself in prison.

It's substantially different

than someone who has repeat, you know, jail
sentencing in and out.

He's also had no history of

probation, he's had no opportunity to get
treatment.

He has a serious drug problem, he

admits to that.

His reason for doing the

clandestined lab was primarily for use, to support
his own use.
He does have a drug problem.
not had the benefit of drug counseling.

He has
He will

seek that, he will take advantage of what exists in
the prison to try to better himself that way.

But

my point is that his history is such that he's
suffering the (Inaudible) consequences for his
involvement here is (Inaudible) him.
He is subject to child support as well
for a child that he currently has.

He's already

not been in a position to make child support
payments for long periods of time due to the
incarceration.

I'm concerned about extending that

further at this point.
Again, he is suffering a punishment,
he's suffering a severe punishment and I'm
concerned about him being able to get out at some
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point here and (Inaudible).

If he could get

2,

himself straight, he (Inaudible) history is such
that he's gotten (Inaudible) with this and I
;(Inaudible) he'll meet those child support
obligations.
Now, that combined with his lack of
having had any opportunity for probation, his age,
yes, he's had his (Inaudible) so some of his first
exposure to the results of it now.
when he did it.

He did it right

He certainly, you know, came in

with a bang here, but he's being punished for that.
He's suffering the consequences and he can be held
for a substantial period of time.

I hope he'll

take advantage of what he can through therapy and
(Inaudible) prison environment.

He's resolved

himself to (Inaudible) his situation.

He's looking

to the future, he's looking at what he can do from
here .
So I would ask you to consider running
these offenses concurrently.
short proximity timewise.

They were in a very

I think that what

happened was while he was litigating his
clandestined lab case he (Inaudible) well.

His

prior history of offenses were related to when he
was picked up on this case.

So those misdemeanor
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offenses related to the same, the driving without a

i

license and all that.

So we would ask you to run

this sentence concurrently with the sentence he's
(Currently serving out.
THE COURT:

Okay.

MR. JOHNSON:
7;
I

MS. DENHARDT:

We have nothing.
Oh, incidentally,

there's one thing I forgot to mention.

With

respect to the restitution amount, Mr. Hollands
claims that this accident was not his fault, it was
the other party's fault.

Given that situation, he

may not be responsible for restitution.
may not.

He may or

I mean, clearly, if he's got possession

of a stolen vehicle at the time, there may be some
causal connection there.

But if the accident is

not his fault, there's a question legally as to
whether he's liable for that.
What I would suggest, and Mr. Mack has
a longer history with this case than I do, I would
suggest a general restitution hearing to allow Mr.
Mack to come in with the benefit of the history of
this case and argue that legal issue.

I don't

think it will be an argument of the amount as much
as just a legal issue as to whether

(Inaudible)

that was being qualified under the restitution
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status.

If it is, (Inaudible) okay.
THE COURT:

And the prosecution's

position on that?
MR. JOHNSON:
appropriate, Judge.

I think that might be

I'm looking through the report

of Mr. (Inaudible) and I just really can't
determine anything as to whose fault it was.

But

Ms. Denhardt's position (Inaudible). I mean there's
no doubt there was a fleeing after the accident but
I'm not sure what the accident itself shows.
THE COURT:

All right.

Mr. Hollands,

is there anything you would like to make me aware
of, any statement that you wish to make?
MR. HOLLAND:

Well, I've been attending

a substance abuse class at the prison.
been working on my GED (Inaudible).

I've also

I'm ready to

lead my life in the right direction when I get out,
be responsible and start to be a member of society.
(Inaudible ) .
THE COURT:

Okay.

Is there any reason

we should not proceed with sentencing?
MS. DENHARDT:

I don't think so, Judge,

as long as we (Inaudible) restitution.
THE COURT:

Okay.

I concur on the

restitution matter and we will set that for a
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restitution hearing.
Mr. Hollands, I have reviewed the
presentence report and although I have listened to
your counsel's position in terms of your
background, it's not quite as lily white as would
appear.

I mean you had 13 juvenile referrals.

And

as counsel has indicated, when you became -entered the adult system, you did in fact enter it
with a bang.

I remind you that this amended down

to a third degree.

You've had other second degrees

and third degree felonies.

Even granting, and I'm

not sure that I necessarily agree with Ms.
Denhardt, but even assuming the criminal history
assessment argument that you have made, I think
there is something to be said for the fact that not
having been given the prior opportunity of
probation, given this history and given the nature
of the offenses that you've committed, I'm not sure
that I disagree at all with the action of the Court
in this matter.
Fortunately or unfortunately, people
that choose a criminal path sometimes work their
way up.

You just started at the top, and I'm not

sure that you deserve a break for that.
Accordingly, I —

despite your counsel's eloquent
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plea, I hereby sentence you to an indeterminate

2|

term of zero to five years at the state prison.

I

am going to recommend to the Board of Prisons that
,t h i s sentence be served consecutive.
I am scheduling a restitution hearing
on the amount that is to be entered as a result of
the damage that was caused by you.

Okay?

I am

also going to enter a $200 recoupment for the
services of your attorney in this matter.
quite sure how that restitution —

I'm not

that recoupment

is going to be paid but I will let adult probation
-- I mean let the parole board and parole officers
worry about that at the time.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:

(Inaudible), how

long do you think?
MR. JOHNSON:

What are we looking at?

UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:
MR. JOHNSON:
THE COURT:
MR. JOHNSON:

June.

That's good.
Okay.
Actually, it depends on

when in June.
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:
MR. JOHNSON:

June 22nd.

That might not work.

going to be out of town (Inaudible).
UNIDENTIFIED SPEAKER:

July?

I'm
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to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and
impose sentence accordingly is D granted D denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence
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D plea of no contest; of the offense of B 1 +
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^efuefendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County^tor delivery to the Utah State
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